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Abstract
We reconsider the concept of two-prover (and more generally: multi-prover) commitments, as
introduced in the late eighties in the seminal work by Ben-Or et al. As was recently shown by
Cre´peau et al., the security of known two-prover commitment schemes not only relies on the explicit
assumption that the two provers cannot communicate, but also depends on what their informa-
tion processing capabilities are. For instance, there exist schemes that are secure against classical
provers but insecure if the provers have quantum information processing capabilities, and there are
schemes that resist such quantum attacks but become insecure when considering general so-called
non-signaling provers, which are restricted solely by the requirement that no communication takes
place.
This poses the natural question whether there exists a two-prover commitment scheme that is
secure under the sole assumption that no communication takes place, and that does not rely on any
further restriction of the information processing capabilities of the dishonest provers; no such scheme
is known.
In this work, we give strong evidence for a negative answer: we show that any single-round two-
prover commitment scheme can be broken by a non-signaling attack. Our negative result is as bad
as it can get: for any candidate scheme that is (almost) perfectly hiding, there exists a strategy that
allows the dishonest provers to open a commitment to an arbitrary bit (almost) as successfully as the
honest provers can open an honestly prepared commitment, i.e., with probability (almost) 1 in case
of a perfectly sound scheme. In the case of multi-round schemes, our impossibility result is restricted
to perfectly hiding schemes.
On the positive side, we show that the impossibility result can be circumvented by considering
three provers instead: there exists a three-prover commitment scheme that is secure against arbitrary
non-signaling attacks.
1 Introduction
Background. A commitment scheme is an important primitive in theoretical cryptography with
various applications, for instance to zero-knowledge proofs and multiparty computation, which themselves
are fundamentally important concepts in modern cryptography. For a commitment scheme to be secure,
it must be hiding and binding. The former means that after the commit phase, the committed value is
still hidden from the verifier, and the latter means that the prover (also referred to as committer) can
open a commitment only to one value. Unfortunately, a commitment scheme cannot be unconditionally
hiding and unconditionally binding at the same time. This is easy to see in the classical setting, and
holds as well when using quantum communication [May97, LC97]. Thus, we have to put some limitation
on the capabilities of the dishonest party. One common approach is to assume that the dishonest prover
(or, alternatively, the dishonest verifier) has limited computing resources, so that he cannot solve certain
computational problems (like factoring large integers). Another approach was suggested by Ben-Or,
Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson in their seminal paper [BGKW88] in the late eighties. They assume
that the prover consists of two (or more) agents that cannot communicate with each other, and they
show the existence of a secure commitment scheme in this two-prover setting. Based on this two-prover
commitment scheme, they then show that every language in NP has a two-prover perfect zero-knowledge
interactive proof system (though there are some subtle issues in this latter result, as discussed in [Yan13]).
A simple example of a two-prover commitment scheme, due to [CSST11], is the following. The verifier
chooses a uniformly random string a ∈ {0, 1}n and sends it to the first prover, who sends back x := r⊕a·b
as the commitment for bit b ∈ {0, 1}, where r ∈ {0, 1}n is a uniformly random string known (only) to
the two provers, and where “⊕” is bit-wise XOR and “·” scalar multiplication (of the scalar b with the
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vector a). In order to open the commitment (to b), the second prover sends back y := r, and the verifier
checks the obvious: whether y = x⊕a · b. It is clear that this scheme is hiding: x := r⊕a · b is uniformly
random and independent of a no matter what b is, and the intuition behind the binding property is
the following. In order to open the commitment to b = 0, the second prover needs to announce y = x;
in order to open to b = 1, he needs to announce y = x ⊕ a. Therefore, in order to open to both, he
must know x and x ⊕ a, which means he knows a, but this is a contradiction to the no-communication
assumption, because a was sent only to the first prover.
In [CSST11], Cre´peau, Salvail, Simard and Tapp show that, as a matter of fact, the security of such
two-prover commitment schemes not only relies on the explicit assumption that the two provers cannot
communicate, but the security also crucially depends on the information processing capabilities of the
dishonest provers. Indeed, they show that a slight variation of the above two-prover commitment scheme
(where some slack is given to the verification y = x ⊕ a · b) is secure against classical provers, but is
completely insecure if the provers have quantum information processing capabilities and can obtain x
and y by means of doing local measurements on an entangled quantum state.1 Furthermore, they show
that the above example two-prover commitment scheme remains secure against such quantum attacks,
but becomes insecure against so-called non-signaling provers. The notion of non-signaling was first
introduced by Khalfin and Tsirelson [TK85] and by Rastall [Ras85] in the context of Bell-inequalities,
and later reintroduced by Popescu and Rohrlich [PR94]. Non-signaling provers are restricted solely by
the requirement that no communication takes place — no additional restriction limits their information
processing capabilities (not even the laws of quantum mechanics) — and thus considering non-signaling
provers is the minimal assumption for the two-prover setting to make sense.
This gives rise to the following question. Does there exist a two-prover commitment scheme that is
secure against arbitrary non-signaling provers? Such a scheme would truly be based on the sole assump-
tion that the provers cannot communicate. No such scheme is known. Clearly, from a practical point of
view, asking for such a scheme may be overkill; given our strong believe in quantum mechanics, relying
on a scheme that resists quantum attacks seems to be a safe bet. But from a theoretical perspective,
this question is certainly in line with the general goal of theoretical cryptography: to find the strongest
possible security based on the weakest possible assumption.
Our Results. In this work, we give strong evidence for a negative answer: we show that there exists
no single-round two-prover commitment scheme that is secure against general non-signaling attacks. Our
impossibility result is as strong as it can get. We show that for any candidate single-round two-prover
commitment scheme that is (almost) perfectly hiding, the binding property can be (almost) completely
broken: there exists a non-signaling strategy that allows the dishonest provers to open a commitment to
an arbitrary bit (almost) as successfully as the honest provers can open an honestly prepared commitment,
i.e., with probability (almost) 1 in case of a perfectly sound scheme. Furthermore, for a restricted but
natural class of schemes, namely for schemes that have the same communication pattern as the above
example scheme, our impossibility result is tight: for every (rational) parameter 0 < ε ≤ 1 there exists
a perfectly sound two-prover commitment scheme that is ε-hiding and as binding as allowed by our
negative result (which is almost not binding if ε is small).
In the case of multi-round schemes, our impossibility result is limited and applies to perfectly hiding
schemes only. Proving the impossibility of non-perfectly-hiding multi-round schemes remains open.
On the positive side, we show the existence of a secure three-prover commitment scheme against
non-signaling attacks. Thus, our impossibility result can be circumvented by considering three instead
of two provers.
Related Work. Two-prover commitments are closely related to relativistic commitments, as intro-
duced by Kent in [Ken99]. In a nutshell, a relativistic commitment scheme is a two-prover commitment
scheme where the no-communication requirement is enforced by having the actions of the two provers
separated by a space-like interval, i.e., the provers are placed far enough apart, and the scheme is ex-
ecuted quickly enough, so that no communication can take place by the laws of special relativity. As
such, our impossibility result immediately implies impossibility of relativistic commitment schemes of
the form we consider (e.g., we do not consider quantum schemes) against general non-signaling attacks.
Very generally speaking, and somewhat surprisingly, the (in)security of cryptographic primitives
against non-signaling attacks may have an impact on more standard cryptographic settings, as was
recently demonstrated by Kalai, Raz and Rothblum [KRR14], who showed the (computational) security
1The above intuition for the binding property of the scheme (which also applies to the variation considered in [CSST11])
fails in the quantum setting where x and y are obtained by means of destructive measurements.
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of a delegation scheme based on the security of an underlying multi-party interactive proof system against
non-signaling (or statistically-close-to-non-signaling) adversaries.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 (Conditional) Distributions
For the purpose of this work, a (probability) distribution is a function p : X → R, x 7→ p(x), where X is
a finite non-empty set, with the properties that p(x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ X and ∑x∈X p(x) = 1. For any
subset Λ ⊂ X , p(Λ) is naturally defined as p(Λ) = ∑x∈Λ p(x), and it holds that
p(Λ) + p(Γ) = p(Λ ∪ Γ)− p(Λ ∩ Γ) ≤ 1 + p(Λ ∩ Γ) (1)
for all Λ,Γ ⊂ X . A probability distribution is bipartite if it is of the form p : X × Y → R. In case of
such a bipartite distribution p(x, y), probabilities like p(x= y), p(x= f(y)), p(x 6= y) etc. are naturally
understood as
p(x=y) = p({(x, y) ∈ X × Y |x = y}) =
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
s.t. x=y
p(x, y)
etc. Also, for a bipartite distribution p : X × Y → R, the marginals p(x) and p(y) are given by
p(x) =
∑
y p(x, y) and p(y) =
∑
x p(x, y), respectively. We note that this notation may lead to an
ambiguity when writing p(w) for some w ∈ X ∩Y; we avoid this by writing p(x=w) or p(y=w) instead,
which are naturally understood. The above obviously extends to arbitrary multipartite distributions
p(x, y, z) etc.
A conditional (probability) distribution is a function p : X × A → R, (x, a) 7→ p(x|a), for finite non-
empty sets X and A, such that for every fixed a∗ ∈ A, the function p(x|a∗) is a probability distribution
in the above sense, which we also write as p(x|a=a∗). As such, the above naturally extends to bi- and
multipartite conditional probability distributions; e.g., if p(x, y|a, b) is a conditional distribution then
p(x|a, b), p(y|a, b), p(x= y|a, b) etc. are all naturally defined. However, we emphasize that for instance
p(x|a) is in general not well defined — unless the corresponding conditional distribution p(b|a) is given,
or unless p(x|a, b) does not depend on b.
Remark 2.1. By convention, we write p(x|a, b) = p(x|a) to express that p(x|a, b) does not depend on b,
i.e., that p(x|a, b1) = p(x|a, b2) for all b1 and b2, and as such p(x|a) is well defined and equals p(x|a, b).
A distribution δ(x) over X is called a Dirac distribution if there exists x∗ ∈ X so that δ(x=x∗) = 1,
and a conditional distribution δ(x|a) over X is called a conditional Dirac distribution if δ(x|a=a∗) is a
Dirac distribution for every a∗ ∈ A, i.e., for every a∗ ∈ A there exists x∗ ∈ X so that δ(x=x∗|a=a∗) = 1.
Note that we often abuse notation slightly and simply write p(x) instead of p : X → R, x 7→ p(x);
furthermore, we may use p for different distributions and distinguish between them by using different
names for the variable, like when we consider the two marginals p(x) and p(y) of a bipartite distribution
p(x, y). Finally, given two distributions p(x0) and q(x1) over the same set X (and similarly if we use the
above convention and denote them by p(x0) and p(x1) instead), we write p(x0) = q(x1) to denote that
p(x0 =w) = q(x1 =w) for all w ∈ X . In a corresponding way, equalities like p(x0, x′0, y) = q(x1, x′1, y)
should be understood; in situations where we feel it is helpful, we may clarify that “x0 is associated with
x1, and x
′
0 with x
′
1”; similarly for conditional distributions.
2.2 Gluing Together Distributions
We recall the definition of the statistical distance.
Definition 2.2. Let p(x0) and p(x1) be two distributions over the same set X .2 Then, their statistical
distance is defined as
d
(
p(x0), p(x1)
)
=
1
2
·
∑
x∈X
∣∣p(x0 =x)− p(x1 =x)∣∣ .
The following property of the statistical distance is well known (see e.g. [RK05]).
2This is without loss of generality: the domain can always be extended by including zero-probability elements.
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Proposition 2.3. Let p(x0) and p(x1) be two distributions over the same set X with d
(
p(x0), p(x1)
)
= ε.
Then, there exists a distribution p′(x0, x1) over X ×X with marginals p′(x0) = p(x0) and p′(x1) = p(x1),
and such that p′(x0 6=x1) = ε.
The following is an immediate consequence.
Lemma 2.4. Let p(x0, y0) and p(x1, y1) be distributions with d
(
p(x0), p(x1)
)
= ε. Then, there exists
a distribution p′(x0, x1, y0, y1) with marginals p′(x0, y0) = p(x0, y0) and p′(x1, y1) = p(x1, y1), and such
that p′(x0 6=x1) = ε and, as a consequence, d
(
p′(x0, y1), p′(x1, y1)
) ≤ ε.
Proof. We first apply Proposition 2.3 to p(x0) and p(x1) to obtain p
′(x0, x1), and then we set
p′(x0, x1, y0, y1) = p′(x0, x1) · p(y0|x0) · p(y1|x1) .
The claims on the marginals and on p′(x0 6=x1) follow immediately, and for the last claim we note that
p′(x0, y1) = p′(x0 =x1) · p′(x0, y1|x0 =x1) + p′(x0 6=x1) · p′(x0, y1|x0 6=x1)
= p′(x0 =x1) · p′(x1, y1|x0 =x1) + p′(x0 6=x1) · p′(x0, y1|x0 6=x1)
and
p′(x1, y1) = p′(x0 =x1) · p′(x1, y1|x0 =x1) + p′(x0 6=x1) · p′(x1, y1|x0 6=x1)
and the claim follows because p′(x0 6=x1) = ε.
Remark 2.5. Note that due to the consistency of the marginals, it makes sense to write p(x0, x1, y0, y1)
instead of p′(x0, x1, y0, y1). We say that we “glue together” p(x0, y0) and p(x1, y1) along x0 and x1.
Remark 2.6. In the special case where p(x0) and p(x1) are identically distributed, i.e., d
(
p(x0), p(x1)
)
=
0, we obviously have p(x0, y1) = p(x1, y1).
Remark 2.7. It is easy to see from the proof of Lemma 2.4 that the following natural property holds. If
p(x0, x1, y0, y1, y
′
0, y
′
1) is obtained by gluing together p(x0, y0, y
′
0) and p(x1, y1, y
′
1) along x0 and x1, then
the marginal p(x0, x1, y0, y1) coincides with the distribution obtained by gluing together the marginals
p(x0, y0) and p(x1, y1) along x0 and x1.
3 Bipartite Systems and Two-Prover Commitments
3.1 One-Round Bipartite Systems
Informally, a bipartite system consists of two subsystem, which we refer to as the left and the right
subsystem. Upon input a to the left and input a′ to the right subsystem, the left subsystem outputs
x and the right subsystem outputs x′ (see Figure 1, left). Formally, the behavior of such a system is
given by a conditional distribution q(x, x′|a, a′), with the interpretation that upon input pair (a, a′), the
system outputs a specific pair (x, x′) with probability q(x, x′|a, a′). Note that we leave the sets A,A′,X
and X ′, from which a, a′, x and x′ are respectively sampled, implicit.
If we do not put any restriction upon the system, then any conditional distribution q(x, x′|a, a′) is
eligible, i.e., describes a bipartite system. However, we are interested in systems where the two subsystems
cannot communicate with each other. How exactly this requirement restricts q(x, x′|a, a′) depends on
the available “resources”. For instance, if the two subsystems are deterministic, i.e., compute x and
x′ as deterministic functions of a and a′ respectively, then this restricts q(x, x′|a, a′) to be of the form
q(x, x′|a, a′) = δ(x|a) · δ(x′|a′) for conditional Dirac distributions δ(x|a) and δ(x′|a′). If in addition to
allowing them to compute deterministic functions, we give the two subsystem shared randomness, then
q(x, x′|a, a′) may be of the form
q(x, x′|a, a′) =
∑
r
p(r) · δ(x|a, r) · δ(x′|a′, r)
for a distribution p(r) and conditional Dirac distributions δ(x|a, r) and δ(x′|a′, r). Such a system is
called classical or local. Interestingly, this is not the end of the story. By the laws of quantum mechanics,
if the two subsystems share an entangled quantum state and obtain x and x′ without communication
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as the result of local measurements that may depend on a and a′, respectively, then this gives rise to
conditional distributions q(x, x′|a, a′) of the form
q(x, x′|a, a′) = 〈ψ∣∣(Eax ⊗ F a′x′ )∣∣ψ〉 ,
where |ψ〉 is a quantum state and {Eax}x and {F a
′
x′ }x′ are so-called POVMs. What this exactly means is
not important for us; what is important is that this leads to a strictly larger class of bipartite systems.
This is typically referred to as a violation of Bell inequalities [Bel64], and is nicely captured by the notion
of nonlocal games. A famous example is the so-called CHSH-game [CHSH69], which is closely connected
to the example two-prover commitment scheme from the introduction, and which shows that the variant
considered in [CSST11] is insecure against quantum attacks.
The largest possible class of bipartite systems that is compatible with the requirement that the two
subsystem do not communicate, but otherwise does not assume anything on the available resources
and/or the underlying physical theory, are the so-called non-signaling systems, defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. A conditional distribution q(x, x′|a, a′) is called a non-signaling (one-round) bipartite
system if it satisfies
q(x|a, a′) = q(x|a) (NS)
as well as with the roles of the primed and unprimed variables exchanged, i.e.,
q(x′|a, a′) = q(x′|a′) (NS′)
Recall that, by the convention in Remark 2.1, the equality (NS) is to be understood in the sense that
q(x|a, a′) does not depend on a′, i.e., that q(x|a, a′1) = q(x|a, a′2) for all a′1, a′2, and correspondingly for
(NS′).
We emphasize that this is the minimal necessary condition for the requirement that the two sub-
systems do not communicate. Indeed, if e.g. q(x|a, a′1) 6= q(x|a, a′2), i.e., if the input-output behavior
of the left subsystem depends on the input to the right subsystem, then the system can be used to
communicate by giving input a′1 or a
′
2 to the right subsystem, and observing the input-output behavior
of the left subsystem. Thus, in such a system, communication does take place.
The non-signaling requirement for a bipartite system is — conceptually and formally — equivalent to
requiring that the two subsystems can (in principle) be queried in any order. Conceptually, it holds
because the left subsystem should be able to deliver its outputs before the right subsystem has received
any input if and only if the output does not depend on the right subsystem’s input (which means that
no information is communicated from right to left), and similarly the other way round. And, formally,
we see that the non-signaling requirement from Definition 3.1 is equivalent to asking that q(x, x′|a, a′)
can be written as
q(x, x′|a, a′) = q(x|a) · q(x′|x, a, a′) and q(x, x′|a, a′) = q(x′|a′) · q(x|x′, a, a′)
for some respective conditional distributions q(x|a) and q(x′|a′). This characterization is a convenient
way to “test” whether a given bipartite system is non-signaling without doing the maths.
Clearly, all classical systems are non-signaling. Also, any quantum system is non-signaling.3 But
there are non-signaling systems that are not quantum (and thus in particular not classical). The typical
example is the NL-box (non-local box; also known as PR-box) [PR94], which, upon input bits a and a′
outputs random output bits x and x′ subject to
x⊕ x′ = a · a′ .
This system is indeed non-signaling, as it can be queried in any order: submit a to the left subsystem to
obtain a uniformly random x, and then submit a′ to the right subsystem to obtain x′ := x ⊕ a · b, and
correspondingly the other way round.
3.2 Two-Round Systems
We now consider bipartite systems as discussed above, but where one can interact with the two subsys-
tems multiple times. We restrict to two rounds: after having input a to the left subsystem and obtained
x as output, one can now input b into the left subsystem and obtain output y, and similarly with the
right subsystem (see Figure 1, right). In such a two-round setting, the non-signaling condition needs to
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Figure 1: A one-round (left) and two-round (right) bipartite system.
be paired with causality, which captures that the output of the first round does not depend on the input
that will be given in the second round.
Definition 3.2. A conditional distribution q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) is called a non-signaling two-round
bipartite system if it satisfies the following two causality constraints
q(x, x′|a, a′, b, b′) = q(x, x′|a, a′) (C1)
and q(x′|x, y, a, a′, b, b′) = q(x′|x, y, a, a′, b) (C2)
and the following two non-signaling constraints
q(x, y|a, a′, b, b′) = q(x, y|a, b) (NS1)
and q(y|x, x′, a, a′, b, b′) = q(y|x, x′, a, a′, b) (NS2)
as well as with the roles of the primed and unprimed variables exchanged.
(C1) captures causality of the overall system, i.e., when considering the left and the right system
as one “big” multi-round system. (C2) captures that no matter what interaction there is with the left
system, the right system still satisfies causality. Similarly, (NS1) captures that the left and the right
system are non-signaling over both rounds, and (NS2) captures that no matter what interaction there
was in the first round, the left and the right system remain non-signaling in the second round.
It is rather clear that these are necessary conditions; we argue that they are sufficient to capture a
non-signaling two-round system in Appendix A.
3.3 Two-Prover Commitments
We consider two-prover commitments of the following form. To commit to bit b, the two provers P and
Q receive respective “questions” a and a′ from the verifier V , and they compute, without communicating
with each other, respective replies x and x′ and send them to V . To open the commitment, P and Q
send respectively y and y′. Finally, V performs some check to decide whether to accept or not.
In case of classical provers P and Q, restricting the opening phase to one round with one-way
communication is without loss of generality: one may always assume that in the opening phase P and
Q simply reveal the shared randomness, and V checks whether x and x′ had been correctly computed,
consistent with the claimed bit b. Restricting the commit phase to one round is, as far as we can see,
not without loss of generality; we discuss the multi-round case later.
Formally, this can be captured as follows.
Definition 3.3. A (single-round) two-prover commitment scheme Com consists of a probability distribu-
tion p(a, a′), two conditional distributions p0(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′) and p1(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′), and an acceptance
predicate Acc(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b).
We say that Com is classical/quantum/non-signaling if p0(x, x
′, y, y′|a, a′) and p1(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′) are
both classical/quantum/non-signaling when parsed as bipartite one-round systems pb((x, y), (x
′, y′)|a, a′).
By default, any two-prover commitment scheme Com is assumed to be non-signaling.
The distribution p(a, a′) captures how V samples the “questions” a and a′, pb(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′) de-
scribes the choices of x and x′ and of y and y′, given that the bit to commit to is b, and Acc(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b)
3Indeed, the two parts of an entangled quantum state can be measured in any order, and the outcome of the first
measurement does not depend on how the other part is going to be measured.
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determines whether V accepts the opening or not. Whether a scheme is classical, quantum or non-
signaling captures the restrictions of the honest provers.
Given a two-prover commitment scheme Com, we define
Prob[Acc|b] :=
∑
a,a′,x,x′,y,y′
p(a, a′) · pb(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′) · Acc(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b) ,
which is the probability that a correctly formed commitment to bit b is successfully opened.
Definition 3.4. A commitment scheme Com is θ-sound if Probp[Acc|b] ≥ θ for b ∈ {0, 1}. We say that
it is perfectly sound if it is 1-sound.
It will be convenient to write p(x0, x
′
0, y0, y
′
0|a, a′) instead of p0(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′) and p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
instead of p1(x, x
′, y, y′|a, a′). Switching to this notation, the hiding property is expressed as follows.
Definition 3.5. Com is called ε-hiding if d
(
p(x0, x
′
0|a, a′), p(x1, x′1|a, a′)
)≤ ε for all a, a′. If Com is
0-hiding, we also say it is perfectly hiding.
Capturing the binding property is more subtle. From the classical approach of defining the binding
property for a commitment scheme, one is tempted to require that once the commit phase is over and
a, a′, x and x′ are fixed, adversarial provers Pˆ and Qˆ cannot come up with an opening to b = 0 and
simultaneously with an opening to b = 1, i.e., with y0, y
′
0 and y1, y
′
1 such that Acc(x, x
′, y0, y′0|a, a′, b=0)
and Acc(x, x′, y1, y′1|a, a′, b= 1) are both satisfied (except with small probability). However, as pointed
out by Dumais, Mayers and Salvail [DMS00], in the context of a general physical theory where y and y′
may possibly be obtained as respective outcomes of destructive measurements (as is the case in quantum
mechanics), such a definition is too weak. It does not exclude that Pˆ and Qˆ can freely choose to open
the commitment to b = 0 or to b = 1, whatever they want, but they cannot do both simultaneously; once
they have produced one opening, their respective states got disturbed and the other opening can then
not be obtained anymore.
Our definition for the binding property is based on the following game between the (honest) verifier
V and the adversarial provers Pˆ , Qˆ.
1. The commit phase is executed: V samples a and a′ according to p(a, a′), and sends a to Pˆ and a′
to Qˆ, upon which Pˆ and Qˆ send x and x′ back to V , respectively.
2. V sends a bit b ∈ {0, 1} to Pˆ and Qˆ.
3. Pˆ and Qˆ try to open the commitment to b: they prepare y and y′ and send them to V .
4. V checks if the verification predicate Acc(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b) is satisfied.
We emphasize that even though in the actual binding game above, the same bit b is given to the two
provers, we require that the response of the provers is well determined by their strategy even in the case
that b 6= b′. Of course, if the provers are allowed to communicate, they are able to detect when b 6= b′
and could reply with, e.g., y = y′ = ⊥ in that case. However, if we restrict to non-signaling provers,
we assume that it is physically impossible for them to communicate with each other and distinguish the
case of b = b′ from b 6= b′.
As such, a non-signaling attack strategy against the binding property of a two-prover commitment
scheme Com is given by a non-signaling two-round bipartite system q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′), as specified
in Definition 3.2. For any such bipartite system, representing a strategy for Pˆ and Qˆ in the above game,
the probability that Pˆ and Qˆ win the game, in that Acc(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b) is satisfied when they have to
open to the bit b, is given by
Prob∗q [Acc|b] :=
∑
a,a′,x,x′,y,y′
p(a, a′) · q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b) · Acc(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b) .
We are now ready to define the binding property.
Definition 3.6. A two-prover commitment scheme Com is δ-binding (against non-signaling attacks) if
it holds for any non-signaling two-round bipartite system q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) that
Prob∗q [Acc|0] + Prob∗q [Acc|1] ≤ 1 + δ .
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In other words, a scheme is δ-binding if in the above game the dishonest provers win with probability
at most (1 + δ)/2 when b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random. If a commitment scheme is binding
(for a small δ) in the sense of Definition 3.6, then for any strategy q for Pˆ and Qˆ, they can just as well
honestly commit to a bit bˆ, where bˆ is set to 0 with probability p0 = Prob
∗
q [Acc|0] and to 1 with probability
p1 = 1 − p0 ≈ Prob∗q [Acc|1], and they will have essentially the same respective success probabilities in
opening the commitment to b = 0 and to b = 1.
4 Impossibility of Two-Prover Commitments
In this section, we show impossibility of secure single-round two-prover commitments against arbitrary
non-signaling attacks. We start with the analysis of a restricted class of schemes which are easier to
understand and for which we obtained stronger results.
4.1 Simple Schemes
We first consider a special, yet natural, class of schemes. We call a two-prover commitment scheme Com
simple if it has the same communication pattern as the scheme described in the introduction. More
formally, it is called simple if a′, x′ and y are “empty” (or fixed), i.e., if Com is given by p(a), p0(x, y′|a),
p1(x, y
′|a) and Acc(x, y′|a, b); to simplify notation, we then write y instead of y′. In other words, P is
only involved in the commit phase, where, in order to commit to bit b, he outputs x upon input a, and
Q is only involved in the opening phase, where he outputs y. The non-signaling requirement for Com
then simplifies to pb(y|a) = pb(y). Recall that by our convention, we may write p(x0, y0|a) instead of
p0(x, y|a) and p(x1, y1|a) instead of p1(x, y|a).
In case of such a simple two-prover commitment scheme Com, a non-signaling two-prover strategy
reduces to a non-signaling one-round bipartite system as specified in Definition 3.1 (see Figure 2).
a
x
b
y
Figure 2: The adversaries’ strategy q(x, y|a, b) in case of a simple commitment scheme.
As a warm-up exercise, we first consider a simple two-prover commitment scheme that is perfectly
hiding and perfectly sound. Recall that formally, a simple scheme is given by p(a), p0(x, y|b), p1(x, y|a)
and Acc(x, y|a, b), and the perfect hiding property means that p0(x|a) = p1(x|a) for any a. To show that
such a scheme cannot be binding, we have to show that there exists a non-signaling one-round bipartite
system q(x, y|a, b) such that Prob∗q [Acc|0]+Prob∗q [Acc|1] is significantly larger than 1. But this is actually
trivial: we can simply set q(x, y|a, b) := pb(x, y|a). It then holds trivially that
Prob∗q [Acc|b] =
∑
a,x,y
p(a) q(x, y|a, b)Acc(x, y|a, b)
=
∑
a,x,y
p(a) pb(x, y|a)Acc(x, y|a, b)
= Probp[Acc|b]
and thus that the dishonest provers are as successful in opening the commitment as are the honest provers
in opening an honestly prepared commitment. Thus, the binding property is broken as badly as it can get.
The only thing that needs to be verified is that q(x, y|a, b) is non-signaling, i.e., that q(x|a, b) = q(x|a)
and q(y|a, b) = q(y|b). To see that the latter holds, note that q(y|a, b) = pb(y|a), and because Com
is non-signaling we have that pb(y|a) = pb(y), i.e., does not depend on a. Thus, the same holds for
q(y|a, b) and we have q(y|a, b) = q(y|b). The former condition follows from the (perfect) hiding property:
q(x|a, b) = pb(x|a) = pb′(x|a) = q(x|a, b′) for arbitrary b, b′ ∈ {0, 1}, and thus q(x|a, b) = q(x|a).
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Below, we show how to extend this result to non-perfectly-binding simple schemes. In this case,
we cannot simply set q(x, y|a, b) := pb(x, y|a), because such a q would not be non-signaling anymore —
it would merely be “almost non-signaling”. Instead, we have to find a strategy q(x, y|a, b) that is
(perfectly) non-signaling and close to pb(x, y|a); we will find such a strategy with the help of Lemma 2.4.
In Section 4.2, we will then consider general schemes where both provers interact with the verifier in both
phases. In this general case, further complications arise.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a simple two-prover commitment scheme Com that is ε-hiding. Then, there
exists a non-signaling strategy q(x, y|a, b) such that
Prob∗q [Acc|0] = Probp[Acc|0] and Prob∗q [Acc|1] ≥ Probp[Acc|1]− ε .
If Com is perfectly sound, it follows that
Prob∗q [Acc|0] + Prob∗q [Acc|1] ≥ 1 + (1− ε)
and thus it cannot be δ-binding for δ < 1− ε.
Proof. Recall that Com is given by p(a), pb(x, y|a) and Acc(x, y|a, b), and we write p(xb, yb|a) instead
of pb(x, y|a). Because Com is ε-hiding, it holds that d
(
p(x0|a), p(x1|a)
) ≤ ε for any fixed a. Thus,
using Lemma 2.4 for every a, we can glue together p(x0, y0|a) and p(x1, y1|a) along x0 and x1 to obtain a
distribution p(x0, x1, y0, y1|a) such that p(x0 6= x1|a) ≤ ε, and in particular d
(
p(x0, y1|a), p(x1, y1|a)
) ≤ ε.
We define a strategy q for the dishonest provers by setting q(x, y|a, b) := p(x0, yb|a) (see Figure 3).
First, we show that q is non-signaling. Indeed, we have q(x|a, b) = p(x0|a) for any b, so q(x|a, b) = q(x|a),
and we have q(y|a, b) = p(yb|a) = p(yb) for any a, and thus q(y|a, b) = q(y|b).
As for the acceptance probability, for b = 0 we have q(x, y|a, 0) = p(x0, y0|a) and as such Prob∗q [Acc|0]
equals Probp[Acc|0]. For b = 1, we have
d
(
q(x, y|a, 1), p(x1, y1|a)
)
= d
(
p(x0, y1|a), p(x1, y1|a)
) ≤ ε
and since the statistical distance does not increase under data processing, it follows that Probp[Acc|1]
and Prob∗q [Acc|1] are ε-close; this proves the claim.
a
x0
b
yb
a
x1 y1y0
a
x0
 
Figure 3: Defining the strategy q by gluing together p(x0, y0|a) and p(x1, y1|a).
The bound on the binding property in Theorem 4.1 is tight, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 4.2. For all ε ∈ Q such that 0 < ε ≤ 1 there exists a classical simple two-prover commitment
scheme that is perfectly sound, ε-hiding and (1− ε)-binding against non-signaling adversaries.
Proof. We construct a scheme where the first prover reveals the bit b right at the beginning with prob-
ability ε. For simplicity, we first assume that ε = 1/n for some integer n ≥ 1 and then indicate how to
extend the proof to arbitrary rational numbers.
The scheme works as follows. Let [n] = {0, . . . , n − 1}. The shared randomness of the provers is
r ∈ [n] selected uniformly at random. The verifier selects a ∈ [n] uniformly at random and sends it to
prover P . If a = r then P reveals x := b to the verifier. Otherwise, he sends back x := ⊥. In the opening
phase, Q sends r to the verifier. The verifier accepts if and only if P revealed b or the output y of Q
satisfies y ∈ [n] and y 6= a.
It is clear that this scheme is sound and ε-hiding. Now consider dishonest provers that follow some
non-signaling strategy q(x, y|a, b). This then defines q(a, x, y|b) = p(a) q(x, y|a, b) with p(a) = 1/n, and
it holds that Prob∗q [Acc|b] = q(x=b|b) + q(x=⊥, y 6= a|b). Since q(y|a, b) = q(y|b), we have
q(y 6=a|b) =
∑
a,y
a6=y
q(a, y|b) =
∑
a,y
a 6=y
p(a) q(y|b) =
∑
y
n− 1
n
q(y|b) = 1− ε .
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Therefore, using that q(x|a, b) = q(x|a) and hence q(x|b=0) = q(x|b=1), we calculate
Prob∗q [Acc|0] + Prob∗q [Acc|1]
= q(x=0|b=0) + q(x=⊥, y 6= a|b=0) + q(x=1|b=1) + q(x=⊥, y 6= a|b=1)
≤ q(x=0|b=0) + q(x=1|b=0) + q(x=⊥|b=0) + q(y 6=a|b=1)
= 1 + (1− ε) .
We now adapt this argument to ε = m/n, where m and n are integers such that 0 < m ≤ n. For every
a ∈ [n], we define a subset Sa of [n] as
Sa = {a+ i mod n | i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}}.
We adapt our scheme by replacing the condition r = a with r ∈ Sa. Clearly, the scheme is still sound.
Since every Sa has exactly m elements, the scheme is ε-hiding: the probability that the first prover
reveals b is m/n = ε; otherwise, he does not give any information about b. The proof that the scheme is
(1 − ε)-binding goes through as before if we can show that q(y 6∈ Sa|a, b) = 1 − ε for any non-signaling
strategy q. Indeed, for every y ∈ [n], there are exactly m values for a such that y ∈ Sa. Since a ∈ [n] is
selected randomly and q(y|a, b) is independent of a, we have q(y 6∈ Sa|a, b) = 1−m/n = 1− ε.
4.2 Arbitrary Schemes
We now remove the restriction on the scheme to be simple. As before, we first consider the case of a
perfectly hiding scheme.
Theorem 4.3. Let Com be a single-round two-prover commitment scheme. If Com is perfectly hiding,
then there exists a non-signaling two-prover strategy q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) such that
Prob∗q [Acc|b] = Probp[Acc|b]
for b ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Com being perfectly hiding means that d(p(x0, x
′
0|a, a′), p(x1, x′1|a, a′)) = 0 for all a and a′. Gluing
together the distributions p(x0, x
′
0, y0, y
′
0|a, a′) and p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) along (x0, x′0) and (x1, x′1) for
every (a, a′), we obtain a distribution p(x0, x′0, x1, x
′
1, y0, y
′
0, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) with the correct marginals and
p((x0, x
′
0) 6= (x1, x′1)|a, a′) = 0. That is, we have x0 = x1 and x′0 = x′1 with certainty. We now define a
strategy for dishonest provers as (Figure 4)
q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) := p(x0, x′0, yb, y′b′ |a, a′) .
Since p(x0, x
′
0, yb, y
′
b|a, a′) = p(xb, x′b, yb, y′b|a, a′), it holds that Prob∗q [Acc|b] = Probp[Acc|b]. It remains
to show that this distribution satisfies the non-signaling and causality constraints (C1) up to (NS2) of
Definition 3.2. This is done below.
• For (C1), note that summing up over y and y′ yields q(x, x′|a, a′, b, b′) = p(x0, x′0|a, a′), which
indeed does not depend on b and b′.
• For (NS1), note that q(x, y|a, a′, b, b′) = p(x0, yb|a, a′) = p(xb, yb|a, a′) = p(xb, yb|a), where the last
equality holds by the non-signaling property of p(xb, yb|a, a′).
• For (C2), first note that
q(x, x′, y|a, a′, b, b′) = p(x0, x′0, yb|a, a′) (2)
which does not depend on b′. We then see that (C2) holds by dividing by q(x, y|a, a′, b, b′) =
p(x0, yb|a, a′).
• For (NS2), divide Equation (2) by q(x, x′|a, a′, b, b′) = p(x0, x′0|a, a′)
The properties (C1) to (NS2) with the roles of the primed and unprimed variables exchanged follows
from symmetry. This concludes the proof.
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Figure 4: Defining the strategy q from p(x0, x
′
0, y0, y
′
0|a, a′) and p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) glued together.
The case of non-perfectly hiding schemes is more involved. At first glance, one might expect that
by proceeding analogously to the proof of Theorem 4.3 — i.e., gluing together p(x0, x
′
0, y0, y
′
0|a, a′) and
p(x1, x
′
1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) along (x0, x′0) and (x1, x′1) and defining q the same way — one can obtain a strategy
q that succeeds with probability 1−ε if the scheme is ε-hiding. Unfortunately, this approach fails because
in order to show (NS1) we use that p(x0, y1|a, a′) = p(x1, y1|a, a′) which in general does not hold for
commitment schemes that are not perfectly hiding. As a consequence, our proof is more involved, and
we have a constant-factor loss in the parameter.
Theorem 4.4. Let Com be a single-round two-prover commitment scheme and suppose that it is ε-hiding.
Then there exists a non-signaling two-prover strategy q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) such that
Prob∗q [Acc|0] = Probp[Acc|0] and Prob∗q [Acc|1] ≥ Probp[Acc|1]− 5ε .
Thus, if Com is perfectly sound, it is at best (1− 5ε)-binding.
To prove this result, we use two lemmas. In the first one, we add the additional assumptions that
p(x0|a, a′) = p(x1|a, a′) and p(x′0|a, a′) = p(x′1|a, a′). The second one shows that we can tweak an
arbitrary scheme in such a way that these additional conditions hold. The proofs are given in Appendix
B.
Lemma 4.5. Let Com be a ε-hiding two-prover commitment scheme with the additional property that
p(x0|a, a′) = p(x1|a, a′) and p(x′0|a, a′) = p(x′1|a, a′). Then, there is a non-signaling p′(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
such that
d
(
p′(x1, x′1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′), p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
) ≤ ε
and p′(x1, x′1|a, a′) = p(x0, x′0|a, a′).
As usual, the non-signaling requirement on p′(x1, x′1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) is to be understood as p′(x1, y1|a, a′) =
p′(x1, y1|a) and p′(x′1, y′1|a, a′) = p′(x′1, y′1|a′).
Lemma 4.6. Let Com be a ε-hiding two-prover commitment scheme. Then, there exists a non-signaling
p˜(x1, x
′
1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) such that
d
(
p˜(x1, x
′
1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′), p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
) ≤ 2ε
which has the property that p˜(x1|a, a′) = p(x0|a, a′) and p˜(x′1|a, a′) = p(x′0|a, a′).
With these two lemmas, Theorem 4.4 is easy to prove.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We start with a ε-hiding non-signaling bit-commitment scheme Com. We apply
Lemma 4.6 and obtain a distribution p˜(x1, x
′
1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) which is 2ε-close to p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) and
satisfies p˜(x1|a, a′) = p(x0|a, a′) and p˜(x′1|a, a′) = p(x′0|a, a′). Furthermore, by triangle inequality
d
(
p˜(x1, x
′
1|a, a′), p(x0, x′0|a, a′)
) ≤ 3ε .
Thus, replacing p(x1, x
′
1, y1, y1|a, a′) by p˜(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) gives us a 3ε-hiding two-prover commit-
ment scheme that satisfies the extra assumption in Lemma 4.5. As a result, we obtain a distribution
p′(x1, x′1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) that is 3ε-close to p˜(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′), and thus 5ε-close to p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′),
with the property that p′(x1, x′1|a, a′) = p(x0, x′0|a, a′). Therefore, replacing p˜(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) by
p′(x1, x′1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) gives us a perfectly hiding two-prover commitment scheme, to which we can apply
Theorem 4.3. As a consequence, there exists a non-signaling strategy q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′) with Prob∗q [Acc|0] =
Probp[Acc|0] and Prob∗q [Acc|1] ≥ Probp[Acc|1]− 5ε, as claimed.
11
Remark 4.7. If Com already satisfies p(x0|a, a′) = p(x1|a, a′) and p(x′0|a, a′) = p(x′1|a, a′), we can apply
Lemma 4.5 right away and thus get a strategy q with Prob∗q [Acc|0] = Probp[Acc|0] and Prob∗q [Acc|1] ≥
Probp[Acc|1]− ε. Thus, with this additional condition, we still obtain a tight bound as in Theorem 4.1.
4.3 Multi-Round Schemes
We briefly discuss a limited extension of our impossibility results for single-round schemes to schemes
where during the commit phase, there is multi-round interaction between the verifier V and the two
provers P and Q. We still assume the opening phase to be one-round; this is without loss of generality in
case of classical two-prover commitment schemes (where the honest provers are restricted to be classical).
In this setting, we have the following impossibility result, which is restricted to perfectly-hiding schemes.
Theorem 4.8. Let Com be a multi-round two-prover commitment scheme. If Com is perfectly hiding,
then there exists a non-signaling two-prover strategy that completely breaks the binding property, in the
sense of Theorem 4.3.
A formal proof of this statement requires a definition of n-round non-signaling bipartite systems for
arbitrary n. Such a definition can be based on the intuition that it must be possible to query the left and
right subsystem in any order. With this definition, the proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of
Theorem 4.3: the non-signaling strategy is obtained by gluing together p(x0,x
′
0|a,a′) and p(x1,x′1|a,a′)
along (x0,x
′
0) and (x1,x
′
1), and setting q(x,x
′, y, y′|a,a′, b, b′) := p(x0,x′0, yb, y′b′ |a,a′), where we use
bold-face notation for the vectors that collect the messages sent during the multi-round commit phase:
a collects all the messages sent by the verifier to the prover P , etc.
As far as we see, the proof of the non-perfect case, i.e. Theorem 4.4, does not generalize immediately
to the multi-round case. As such, proving the impossibility of non-perfectly-hiding multi-round two-prover
commitment schemes remains an open problem.
5 Possibility of Three-Prover Commitments
It turns out that we can overcome the impossibility results by adding a third prover. We will describe a
scheme that is perfectly sound, perfectly hiding and 2−n-binding with communication complexity O(n).
We now define what it means for three provers to be non-signaling; since our scheme is similar to a
simple scheme, we can simplify this somewhat. We consider distributions q(x, y, z|a, b, c) where a and x
are input and output of the first prover P , b and y are input and output of the second prover Q and c
and z are input and output of the third prover R.
Definition 5.1. A conditional distribution q(x, y, z|a, b, c) is called a non-signaling (one-round) tripartite
system if it satisfies
q(x|a, b, c) = q(x|a) , q(y|a, b, c) = q(y|b) , q(z|a, b, c) = q(z|c) ,
q(x, y|a, b, c) = q(x, y|a, b) , q(x, z|a, b, c) = q(x, z|a, c)
and q(y, z|a, b, c) = q(y, z|b, c) .
In other words, for any way of viewing q as a bipartite system by dividing in- and outputs consistently
into two groups, we get a non-signaling bipartite system. Actually, by means of Lemma A.2, it is not
hard to see that the first three requirements follow by the (union of the) latter three.
We restrict to simple schemes, where during the commit phase, only P is active, sending x upon
receiving a from the verifier, and during the opening phase, only Q and R are active, sending y and z to
the verifier, respectively.
Definition 5.2. A simple three-prover commitment scheme Com consists of a probability distribution
p(a), two distributions p0(x, y, z|a) and p1(x, y, z|a), and an acceptance predicate Acc(x, y, z|a, b).
It is called classical/quantum/non-signaling if pb(x, y, z|a) is, when understood as a tripartite system
pb(x, y, z|a, ∅, ∅) with two “empty” inputs.
Soundness and the hiding-property are defined in the obvious way. As for the binding property, for
a simple three-prover commitment scheme Com and a non-signaling strategy q(x, y, z|a, b, c), let
Prob∗q [Acc|b] =
∑
a,x,y,z
p(a) · q(x, y, z|a, b, b) · Acc(x, y, z|a, b) .
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We say that Com is δ-binding if
Prob∗q [Acc|0] + Prob∗q [Acc|1] ≤ 1 + δ.
Theorem 5.3. For every positive integer n, there exists a classical simple three-prover commitment
scheme that is perfectly sound, perfectly hiding and 2−n-binding. The verifier communicates n bits to the
first prover and receives n bits from each prover.
The scheme that achieves this is essentially the same as the example two-prover scheme described in
the introduction, except that we add a third prover that imitates the actions of the second. To be more
precise: the provers P , Q and R have as shared randomness a uniformly random r ∈ {0, 1}n. The verifier
V chooses a uniformly random a ∈ {0, 1}n and sends it to P . As commitment, P returns x := r ⊕ a · b.
To open the commitment to b, Q and R send y := r and z := r to V who accepts if and only if y = z
and x = y ⊕ a · b.
Before beginning with the formal proof that this scheme has the properties stated in our theorem, we
give some intuition. Let a and x be the input and output of the dishonest first prover, P . To succeed,
the second prover Q has to produce output x ⊕ a · b where b is the second prover’s input and the third
prover R has to produce x⊕a · c where c is the third prover’s input. Our theorem implies that a strategy
which always produces these outputs must be signaling. Why is that the case?
In the game that defines the binding-property, we always have b = c, but the dishonest provers must
obey the non-signaling constraint even in the “impossible” case that b 6= c. Let us consider the XOR of
Q’s output and R’s output in the case that b 6= c: we get (x⊕ a · b)⊕ (x⊕ a · c) = a · b⊕ a · c = a. But in
the non-signaling setting, the joint distribution of Q’s and R’s output may not depend on a. Thus, the
strategy we suggested does not satisfy the non-signaling constraint. Let us now prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. It is easy to see that the scheme is sound. Furthermore, for every fixed a and b,
pb(x|a) is uniform, so the scheme is perfectly hiding. Now consider a non-signaling strategy q for dishonest
provers. The provers succeed if and only if y = z = x⊕a·b. Define q(a, x, y, z|b, c) = p(a)·q(x, y, z|a, b, c).
The non-signaling property implies that
q(y = x⊕ a · b|a, b, c = 0) = q(y = x⊕ a · b|a, b, c = 1) and (3)
q(z = x⊕ a · c|a, b = 0, c) = q(z = x⊕ a · c|a, b = 1, c) . (4)
It follows that
Prob∗q [Acc|0] + Prob∗q [Acc|1]
= q(y = x⊕ a · b, z = x⊕ a · c|b = 0, c = 0)
+ q(y = x⊕ a · b, z = x⊕ a · c|b = 1, c = 1)
≤ q(y = x⊕ a · b|b = 0, c = 0) + q(z = x⊕ a · c|b = 1, c = 1)
= q(y = x⊕ a · b|b = 0, c = 1) + q(z = x⊕ a · c|b = 0, c = 1)
by Equations (3) and (4)
≤ 1 + q(y = x⊕ a · b, z = x⊕ a · c|b = 0, c = 1) by Equation (1)
It now remains to upper-bound q(y = x ⊕ a · b, z = x ⊕ a · c|b = 0, c = 1). Since p(a) is uniform and
q(y, z|a, b, c) is independent of a, we have
q(y = x⊕ a · b, z = x⊕ a · c|b = 0, c = 1) ≤ q(y ⊕ z = a|b = 0, c = 1) = 1
2n
and thus our scheme is 2−n-binding.
Remark 5.4. The three-prover scheme above has the drawback that two provers are involved in the
opening phase; as such, there needs to be agreement on whether to open the commitment or not; if there
is disagreement then this may be problematic in certain applications. However, P and Q are not allowed
to communicate. One possible solution is to have V forward an authenticated “open” or “not open”
message from P to Q and R. This allows for some communication from P to Q and R, but if the size
of the authentication tag is small enough compared to the security parameter of the scheme, i.e., n, then
security is still ensured.
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A Capturing the Non-signaling property
In this section, we argue that Definition 3.2 is not only necessary but also sufficient to capture the
non-signaling constraint. Consider a two-round bipartite system that conforms to Definition 3.2. We
show that the two subsystems can be queried in any order without altering the output distribution, as
long as the order of rounds for each subsystem individually is respected. Thus, it is impossible to obtain
information about the right side of the system by observing only the behaviour on the left side (and vice
versa), which shows that Definition 3.2 is indeed sufficient. First, we point out the following.
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Remark A.1. (C1) and (NS1) together imply that q(x|a, b) and q(x|a, a′) are well-defined and satisfy
q(x|a, b) = q(x|a) (C3) and q(x|a, a′) = q(x|a) (NS3) .
This follows from Lemma A.2 below.
Lemma A.2. Any conditional distribution q(x|a, b, c, d) that satisfies q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a, b) as well as
q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a, c), must also satisfy q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a).
Proof. Recall that, by convention, q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a, b) means q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a, b, c′, d′) for all
x, a, b, c, c′, d, d′, and similarly for q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a, c). As such, for arbitrary x, a, b, b′, c, c′, d, d′ it
holds that
q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a, b, c′, d′) = q(x|a, b′, c′, d′)
and thus q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a).
If q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) is a non-signaling two-round bipartite system, then it can be written as
q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) = q(x, y|a, b) · q(x′, y′|x, y, a, a′, b, b′)
= q(x|a) · q(y|x, a, b) · q(x′|x, y, a, a′, b) · q(y′|x, y, a, a′, b, b′)
where the first equality uses (NS1), and the second uses (C3) and (C2), and as
q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′)
= q(x, x′|a, a′) · q(y, y′|x, x′, a, a′, b, b′)
= q(x|a) · q(x′|x, a, a′) · q(y|x, x′, a, a′, b) · q(y′|x, x′, y, a, a′, b, b′)
where the first equality uses (C1), and the second uses (NS3) and (NS2), and the second equality can
also be replaced by
= q(x|a) · q(x′|x, a, a′) · q(y′|x, x′, a, a′, b′) · q(y|x, x′, y, a, a′, b, b′) .
And, similarly, with the roles of the primed and unprimed variables exchanged. This shows that the two
subsystems can be queried in any order. For instance, one can first query the left subsystem to get x
on input a, distributed according to q(x|a), and then y on input b, distributed according to q(y|x, a, b),
and then then one can query the right subsystem twice to get x′ and y′, distributed according to
q(x′|x, y, a, a′, b) and q(y′|x, y, a, a′, b, b′), respectively.4 Or, one can first query the left subsystem once
to obtain x, then query the right subsystem to obtain x′ etc. It is straightforward to verify that all six
eligible orderings are possible.
B Proofs of Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6
Proof of Lemma 4.5. For arbitrary a and a′, we use Lemma 2.4 to glue together the distributions
p(x0, x
′
0, y0, y
′
0|a, a′) and p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) to obtain a joint distribution p(x0, x′0, x1, x′1, y0, y′0, y1, y′1|a, a′)
such that
p
(
(x0, x
′
0) 6= (x1, x′1)|a, a′
) ≤ ε ,
and thus d(p(x0, x
′
0, y1, y
′
1|a, a′), p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)) ≤ ε. Let Λ be the event that both x0 = x1 and
x′0 = x
′
1. We define p
′(x1, x′1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) as follows, where x0 is associated with x1 and x′0 with x′1:
p′(x1, x′1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) := p(Λ, x0, x′0|a, a′) · p(y1, y′1|Λ, x1, x′1, a, a′)
+ p(Λ, x0, x
′
0|a, a′) · r(y1|x0, a, a′) · r(y′1|x′0, a, a′)
= p(Λ, x1, x
′
1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′)
+ p(Λ, x0, x
′
0|a, a′) · r(y1|x0, a, a′) · r(y′1|x′0, a, a′)
4Note that in oder to sample, say, x′ according to q(x′|x, y, a, a′, b), it seems like that the right subsystem needs to
know a, x etc., i.e., that communication is necessary, contradicting the non-signaling requirement. However, this reasoning
merely shows that in general, such a non-signaling system is not classical.
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where r(y1|x0, a, a′) and r(y′1|x′0, a, a′) are to be defined later, and the last equality holds by definition
of Λ.5
The claim about the closeness to p(x1, x
′
1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) follows from the fact that p(Λ|a, a′) ≤ ε.
Furthermore, we have p′(x1, x′1|a, a′) = p(Λ, x0, x′0|a, a′) + p(Λ, x0, x′0|a, a′) = p(x0, x′0|a, a′) as claimed.
It remains to show that we can achieve p′ to be non-signaling. For that, we simply define r(y1|x0, a, a′),
and similarly r(y′1|x′0, a, a′), in such a way that p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p(x1, y1|a, a′); this does the job since
p(x1, y1|a, a′) = p(x1, y1|a), and as such p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p′(x1, y1|a). Note that
p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′) + p(Λ, x0|a, a′) · r(y1|x0, a, a′) . (5)
Thus, we set
r(y1|x0, a, a′) := p(x1, y1|a, a
′)− p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′)
p(Λ, x0|a, a′)
=
p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′)
p(Λ, x0|a, a′)
It remains to show that r(y1|x0, a, a′) as defined is indeed a probability distribution, and that things
work out also in case p(Λ, x0|a, a′) = 0.
In the latter case, we have p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′), independent of the choice of r; thus,
it remains to show that p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′) = p(x1, y1|a, a′). For that, we observe that p(Λ, x1|a, a′) =
p(Λ, x0|a, a′) = p(x0|a, a′) = p(x1|a, a′), where the first equality is due to the definition of Λ and the last
holds by our additional assumption on Com. It follows that∑
y1
p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′) = p(Λ, x1|a, a′) = p(x1|a, a′) =
∑
y1
p(x1, y1|a, a′)
and since p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′) ≤ p(x1, y1|a, a′), it holds that p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′) = p(x1, y1|a, a′) as required.
Finally, to show that r(y1|x0, a, a′) is a probability distribution, we observe that r(y1|x0, a, a′) ≥ 0,
and, summing over y1 and using that p(x0|a, a′) = p(x1|a, a′), we see that∑
y1
r(y1|x0, a, a′) = p(x1|a, a
′)− p(Λ, x1|a, a′)
p(Λ, x0|a, a′)
=
p(x0|a, a′)− p(Λ, x0|a, a′)
p(Λ, x0|a, a′)
=
p(Λ, x0|a, a′)
p(Λ, x0|a, a′)
= 1 .
In the same way, it is possible to choose r(y′1|x′0, a, a′) so that p′(x′1, y′1|a, a′) = p(x′1, y′1|a, a′) = p(x′1, y′1|a′),
using the assumption that p(x′0|a, a′) = p(x′1|a, a′). This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. We begin by adjusting the distribution of x1. By the hiding property of Com,
p(x0, x
′
0|a, a′) and p(x1, x′1|a, a′) are ε-close, and thus in particular d(p(x0|a, a′), p(x1|a, a′)) ≤ ε. Gluing
together the distributions p(x0|a, a′) and p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) along x0 and x1, we get p(x0, x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
such that
p′(x1, x′1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) := p(x0, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
satisfies d
(
p′(x1, x′1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′), p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
) ≤ ε and also p′(x1|a, a′) = p(x0|a, a′).
We show that p′ is non-signaling. Since p′(x′1, y
′
1|a, a′) = p(x′1, y′1|a, a′) and p is non-signaling,
it follows that p′(x′1, y
′
1|a, a′) = p′(x′1, y′1|a′). Showing that p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p′(x1, y1|a) is equiva-
lent to showing that p(x0, y1|a, a′) = p(x0, y1|a). By the observation in Remark 2.7, the marginal
p(x0, x1, y1|a, a′) is obtained by gluing together p(x0|a, a′) and p(x1, y1|a, a′) along x0 and x1. Since
Com is non-signaling, it holds that p(x0|a, a′) = p(x0|a) and p(x1, y1|a, a′) = p(x1, y1|a). It follows that
p(x0, x1, y1|a, a′) = p(x0, x1, y1|a), and therefore that p(x0, y1|a, a′) = p(x0, y1|a).
In order to obtain p˜ as claimed, we repeat the above process. Note that the modification from p to
p′ did not change the distribution of x′1, y
′
1, i.e., p
′(x′1, y
′
1|a, a′) = p(x′1, y′1|a, a′), and thus in particular
d
(
p(x′0|a, a′), p′(x′1|a, a′)
)
= d
(
p(x′0|a, a′), p(x′1|a, a′)
) ≤ ε. Therefore, exactly as above, we can now
adjust the distribution of x′1 in p
′ and obtain a non-signaling p˜(x1, x′1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) that is ε-close to
p′(x1, x′1, y1, y
′
1|a, a′) and thus 2ε-close to p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′), and which satisfies p˜(x′1|a, a′) = p(x′0|a, a′)
and p˜(x1|a, a′) = p′(x1|a, a′) = p(x0|a, a′), as claimed.
5Algorithmically, the distribution p′ should be understood as follows. First, x0, x′0, x1 and x
′
1 are sampled according
to the glued-together distribution p. Then, if the event Λ occurred (i.e. x0 = x1 and x′0 = x
′
1), y1 and y
′
1 are sampled
according to the corresponding conditional distribution; otherwise, they are chosen independently according to distributions
that depend only on x0 and x′0, respectively.
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